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WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED  
Abstract 
 
The theory of groupthink has been highly beneficial in the study of how groups make 
decisions. It has permeated almost every field containing decision making groups. 
Despite its popularity, there has been a surprising lack of empirical support for the model. 
It is the aim of this paper to suggest a possible explanation for the current state of 
groupthink research. First the groupthink model is described briefly, followed by a look 
at several selected empirical and case studies of groupthink. A potential reason for the 
dearth of empirical is then proposed along with a suggestion for future groupthink 
research. 
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Introduction 
 
Janis’ (1972, 1982) Groupthink model has been transformatory in the study of 
how groups operate and make decisions. Ever since its inception, it has been expanded 
beyond its origins, explaining the functioning of policy making groups, and has been 
used to analyze the decisions made by pretty much any decision-making group. The 
theory has, however, met with criticism. A particular issue that arises when viewing 
groupthink research is the lack of empirical support for the phenomenon. Empirical 
research has yet to show full or even significant support for groupthink. Furthermore, 
studies that offer partial support of the model have been largely inconsistent in which 
aspects of the model they support. Qualitative and case study analyses, on the other hand, 
have in many cases provided substantial support for the model. Why, then, has it thus far 
been impossible to find the same support empirically? One could chalk it up to the 
surprising dearth of research on the topic, however, this still doesn’t explain the 
inconsistency present in the existing body of empirical evidence. It is the purpose of this 
paper to put forth a possible explanation for this discrepancy. In order to do this we must 
briefly describe the creation of a groupthink model and its framework. Then it is prudent 
to establish the discrepancy between qualitative and quantitative research on the matter 
by briefly examining a selection of both empirical and case studies of groupthink. This 
will be followed by addressing some criticism of the model and proposing a direction for 
future groupthink research.  
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Initial Research & The Groupthink Model 
 
The term “groupthink” was first coined by Irving L. Janis in his 1972 book 
“Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and 
Fiascoes”. For all intents and purposes he is the father of all research on Groupthink. 
Janis (a research psychologist at Yale and later a professor at University of California, 
Berkeley)  was prompted to propose this theory while reading about the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion (the Kennedy administration’s failed attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in 
Cuba). Janis pondered on how Kennedy and his advisors (an elite group of seemingly 
intelligent individuals) could have approved such a flawed plan. This question led him 
investigate how groups, even when made of adequately equipped and qualified 
individuals, could make bad decisions. To investigate his hypothesis he utilized several 
high profile failures of American foreign-policy, namely the Bay of Pigs Invasion, The 
Korean War, The Vietnam War and the Attack on Pearl Harbor, although Janis 
acknowledged that the phenomenon of groupthink could occur in any situation involving 
group decision making. In his own words groupthink can be stated as “a deterioration of 
mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group 
pressures”.  
 
Through his analysis of the aforementioned case studies, Janis noticed 6 issues 
that could possibly contribute to a group’s failure to make good decisions. These were as 
follows: 1. Only exploring a limited range of possible solutions 2. A failure to critically 
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re-evaluate a solution that was chosen by the majority 3. Failure to re-evaluate initially 
rejected solutions 4. Little to no effort ro get expert opinions on the pros and cons of a 
particular course of action 5. A bias towards selecting information that backs up their 
chosen solution and 6. No deliberation on possible roadblocks that could hinder said 
solution. Janis saw these six behaviors as key hindrances to making good group 
decisions. These behaviors were generalized into 8 “symptoms” or warning signs of 
groupthink.  
1. A false sense of invincibility among members that leads to dangerous 
levels of optimism and risk taking 
2. Mutual attempts to discredit potential issues and justify the chosen course 
of action 
3. Undoubting belief in the ethicality of the group that leads members to 
disregard potential ethical consequences of group decisions 
4. Negative view of opposing groups such that less aggressive responses 
seem ineffective 
5. Pressure on any dissenting members 
6. Self-censorship of any contradictory thoughts or actions 
7. An illusion of concurrency with the decision of the majority, largely due 
to self-censorship 
8. Active repression of contradictory information by members of the group to 
preserve the sanctity of the group (termed “mindguards” by Janis) 
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These eight symptoms, when present can serve as strong predictors of ineffective group 
decision making.  
 
It should be noted at this point that there is a very fine line between beneficially 
cohesive groups and conditions that could result in groupthink. Janis acknowledged that 
cohesive groups can in many cases can be far more effective than an individual when it 
comes to making decisions, however highly cohesive groups are also very susceptible to 
the occurrence of groupthink. In response, Janis suggested several measures that could 
possibly counteract the effect of groupthink 
 
 
Preventing Groupthink 
 
Janis proposed three primary methods of countering the effects of groupthink. They are 
as follows: 
1. Leaders of a group should encourage every member to critically evaluate all 
decisions and voice any concerns they might have. Furthermore, the leader must 
be willing to accept said criticism as well if they pertain to his/her judgements.  
2. When assigning a task to a group one must be careful not let expectations of the 
outcome influence the decisions of the group. Therefore, when stating the issue 
which is to be tackled, it is best to do it in an impartial manner, merely stating the 
facts.  
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3. Multiple independent groups should be set up to tackle the same issue, each with 
its own separate leader. 
These three practices in theory should help combat the effects of groupthink, but also 
create other issues of their own. Allowing critical evaluation of every decision made by a 
group is a time intensive process and is not practical in matters that might necessitate a 
rapid response. Furthermore, constant criticism could lead to a deterioration in the 
relationship among group members. Being impartial in explaining an issue and 
withholding information on expected outcomes might lead to a conflict between the 
leader and the members of the group. Having several groups work on the same issue 
seems rather wasteful and labor intensive and also limits the responsibility felt by each 
individual group. Janis therefore prescribed several more methods of fighting groupthink 
based on the generalized “symptoms”, dealing with the issue of group insulation in 
particular. He notes, however, that said techniques could diminish group cohesiveness as 
a result. They are as follows: 
● During the review of alternatives, it may be beneficial for the group to break into 
subgroups under separate leaders and then come back together to discuss their 
findings.  
● Every group member should discuss the group’s decisions and deliberations with 
a colleague who is not a member of the group and make note of their responses. 
● Qualified individuals outside of the group should be periodically invited to group 
discussions in order question and test the views held by the group. 
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In addition to these points, Janis made additional ones to tackle issues resulting from 
leadership bias. 
● At least one member of the group should play the role of the devil’s advocate, this 
operates on the same principle as Janis’ first method of countering groupthink but 
is somewhat more practical. 
● In decisions dealing with an opposing organization, an adequate amount of time 
should be devoted to analysing alternative courses of action that the opponent 
could take. 
● After reaching an initial consensus on a course of action, the group should allow 
any remaining concerns about said course of action to be voiced and allow a 
re-evaluation of the plan. 
Janis’ notes that all of these are only partial solutions to countering groupthink and must 
be used with caution lest they cause new issues of their own. Furthermore, Janis suggests 
that members of policy-making groups be educated on the concept of groupthink so as to 
better counteract its effects 
 
 
 
Revision and Expansion: An Update of the Groupthink Model 
 
In 1982, Janis created a revised and expanded model of groupthink in his book 
Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. The resulting model 
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was far clearer and easier to understand. Janis distinctly describes, in their order of 
occurrence, the antecedent conditions, symptoms and consequences of groupthink. These 
conditions can be split into three groups, the first being the cardinal condition (group 
cohesion, which is necessary for the occurrence of groupthink), followed by structural 
faults and situational factors (both of which consist of “additional” antecedent conditions 
which increase the likelihood of groupthink but are not essential to its occurrence) The 
antecedent conditions as laid out by Janis are as follows: 
1. A high degree of group cohesiveness​.​​ This is what Janis sees as the most 
important antecedent condition. Janis notes that incohesive groups can also fall 
victim to bad decision making, albeit for reasons other than groupthink. Without 
this condition, groupthink cannot occur. 
2. Insulation of the group​. ​​This is the first of what Janis refers to as structural faults, 
issues with the way the group operates. These conditions are not necessary for the 
occurrence of groupthink, like group cohesion, but will certainly increase the 
likelihood that it will occur. Insulation refers to the isolation of the group from 
outsiders who could provide useful insight or different perspectives during the 
decision making process.  
3. Absence of unbiased leadership​. ​​A strong and influential leader who does not 
utilize an unbiased style of leadership can easily exhibit a degree of influence on 
the decisions made by his or her group. In effect, this refers to a failure to adhere 
to a leadership style encouraging critical evaluation and inquiry and reliance on 
more authoritarian forms of leadership.  
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4. Dearth of framework for systematic decision making procedure​. This factor in 
particular denotes the lack of a clearly delineated system used to make decisions, 
which could potentially counteract the effects of groupthink. 
5. Homogeneity of social and ideological characteristics of members​. This factor, as 
well as the previous three structural factors, represent the absence of possible 
preventative measure to combat groupthink. If group members are homogeneous 
in the way they think, they are less likely to discuss and suggest divergent views.  
6. High stress resulting from external threats. ​This factor highlights the important 
role played by stress in the groupthink model. However, there is a caveat to this 
factor in that high stress alone does not necessarily result in groupthink (examples 
provided by Janis suggest that it could even have the opposite effect). For stress to 
play a role in causing groupthink, a low degree of faith in finding an alternate 
solution must also be present. 
7. Low self esteem among group members. ​The final antecedent condition focuses on 
the role played by internal stress (as opposed to the external stress in the previous 
factor). This internal stress leads to low levels of self esteem and occurs due to A) 
recent bad outcomes of decisions/failed decisions, B) perception of incompetency 
among members at tackling the complex decisions that must be made and C) 
moral dilemma resulting from a need to make urgent and critical decision.  
These antecedent conditions lead to a tendency for concurrency-seeking. 
Concurrency-seeking as per Janis is the underlying mechanism of groupthink. 
Concurrence-seeking refers to the response of the group to both internal and external 
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stressors in hopes of maintaining the emotional composure of the group. This process 
results in the occurrence of groupthink defined by the eight symptoms of groupthink 
briefly described below: 
1. Illusion of Invulnerability. ​This leads to an dangerous level of optimism and 
advocates sever risk taking. 
2. Undisputed belief in morality of the group. ​This leads to ignorance of the ethical 
or moral consequences of the group’s choices. 
3. Rationalization​. This is done by members of the group as a collective in order to 
dismiss any threats to the group’s chosen course of action. 
4. Stereotypical perception of opposition​. Oppositional groups and/or individuals are 
perceived as incompetent and/or morally inferior. 
5. Self-Censorship​. This is done by individual members of the group to suppress any 
doubts or concerns they might have regarding the decisions being made. 
6. Collective perception of agreement​. Group share an illusion of accord with the 
decision made by the majority of the group, this could be due to self-censorship. 
7. Pressure on dissenters​. Any member who challenges the consensus of the group 
is shown that this is not the expected behavior of a loyal group member. 
8. Appearance of mindguards​. Certain members of the group might assign 
themselves the selective role of a “mindguard” and actively control and even 
repress threatening information. 
The symptoms can also be arranged into three types, namely overestimations, closed 
mindedness and pressures towards uniformity. Overestimations comprises the first 2 
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symptoms (illusion of invulnerability and undisputed beliefs in group morality), closed 
mindedness refers to the following 2 symptoms (rationalization and stereotyped views of 
the opposition) and pressures towards uniformity deals with the final 4 symptoms 
(self-censorship, collective perception of agreement pressure on dissenters and the 
appearance of mindguards). These symptoms of groupthink serve as predictors for the 
consequences of groupthink. Janis also referred to these consequences as defects in 
decision making resulting from groupthink. They are as follows:  
1. Insufficient analysis of alternate courses of action 
2. Inadequate discussion of group objectives 
3. Failure to explore and discuss the consequences of the initial course of action 
4. Deficient exploration of information that could influence decisions 
5. Failure to reevaluate rejected courses of action 
6. Biased processing of available information 
7. Lack of effort devoted to planning for contingencies 
A visual depiction of the groupthink model in its entirety is attached in the appendix 
(Figure 1). It details each category of the model as well the causal sequencing of factors, 
allowing a clear understanding of what Janis theorized. 
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Groupthink Beyond American Foreign Policy 
 
While Janis may have focused solely on American foreign policy fiascoes when 
developing the theory of groupthink, he acknowledges that groupthink can occur in other 
contexts as well. Notable ones that he mentions are French military leaders and their 
reliance on the defences of the Maginot line in World War II, Neville Chamberlain’s 
administration’s policy of “peace” and ignorance of the growing German threat in the late 
1930s, the Aberfan disaster of 1966 and the Thalidomide Birth Defects Scandal.  
 
Another important study that served to expand the horizons of the applications of 
the groupthink theory was Eaton (2001). Eaton applied Janis’ groupthink theory to two 
high profile business debacles that rocked the British markets in the mid to late 1990s. 
The two firms involved were Marks & Spencers, a leading multinational retailer based 
out of the UK, and British Airways. It is interesting to note that in both cases the issues 
arose as a result of the company pursuing a rapid globalization strategy. Eaton notes 
Janis’ lack of attention to cases of groupthink outside of foreign policy, but also states 
that applying the concept to the realm of corporations doesn’t require significant 
modification of the original theory. In his own words, “managerial thought” and practices 
have changed since 1972 and, due to the prevalence of the concept of corporate “culture”, 
there has been more significance attached to reaching consensus. Furthermore, he notes 
two factors that could have been overlooked by Janis, citing evidence from two earlier 
articles. These factors are the amount of influence or power a leader has over his/her 
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subordinates (Flowers, 1977) and acceptance of a convention put forth by a powerful 
leader (McCauley, 1989). In order to apply the theory to his chosen case studies, Eaton 
utilized content analysis of press reports (mainly from ​The Guardian ​and ​The 
Independent​) during the period of 1994-1999. He paid special attention to sentences or 
themes that related to the key symptoms of groupthink. There is an inherent level of 
subjectivity in this method, which Eaton acknowledged, but he states that the primary 
purpose of the search was to find statements that clearly indicated a dangerously high 
level of consensus. 
 
 
Case Study Analyses of Groupthink 
 
By and large, the main body of research in support of Janis’ (1972,1982) 
Groupthink model has come from qualitative and case studies such as Eaton (2001). In 
order to get a better understanding of the model, the following section will detail several 
notable studies in the field in an attempt to better illustrate the theory as well as highlight 
the differences between qualitative and empirical research on Groupthink. The selection 
of studies for this paper is based on Park (2000), which offered a detailed overview of 
research pertaining to groupthink. 
 
Manz & Sims (1982) was another attempt to extend the groupthink model into a 
business context. In particular the researchers looked at autonomous work groups based 
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at a manufacturing plant in the US. The work groups at the plant ranged in size from 3-19 
members. Each group was run by an elected leader, who received additional 
compensation along with increased responsibility. These work groups often had to deal 
with abstract situations involving everything from quality control to production or 
personnel problems. The group leaders arranged weekly meetings to discuss the 
problems, and also occasionally invited upper management to attend. Manz & Sims used 
three cases taken from these weekly meetings in order to illustrate Groupthink in action. 
The first case dealt with a discussion regarding a change in the shift schedule. It had been 
suggested that the shifts be moved to earlier in the day so that workers would be able to 
leave around early to mid afternoon. The group leader started out by noting that no one 
had spoken out against the keeping the current shift schedule in a previous meeting, 
thereby clearly illustrating both partial leadership and the illusion of unanimity. The one 
dissenter who advocated for the change in shift schedules was pressured by the group 
leader as well as the majority to capitulate. Self-censorship was also seen in the previous 
meeting, only one member openly voiced dissent despite numerous members showing 
clear nonverbal cues that they disagreed with the decisions being made. The second case 
dealt with a situation involving a quality control work group. During the discussion, a 
member noted that the group had been receiving a large number of complaints. The 
resulting discussion of this issue exhibited several signs of Groupthink. The group 
discovered that the source of complaints was a production work group that was unhappy 
with quality control for drawing out the quality evaluation process and causing a fall in 
productivity. A majority of the discussion centered around support for the group, backing 
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up the perception that they were not to blame for these issues and that the complaints 
were unwarranted. This was interpreted as indicative of rationalization and stereotyped 
views of the production workgroup (the opposition). The third and final case was based 
on the discussions of another production work group regarding another quality control 
issue. During this discussion the upper management liaison to the group was also present 
at the meeting, soon after the discussion began he quickly took charge and stated what he 
thought the correct course of action should be. This is another clear violation of impartial 
leadership and thereby a contributing factor to Groupthink. Symptoms of groupthink seen 
in this case include self-censorship, seen on the part of the group members who showed 
nonverbal cues of disagreement despite not voicing said disagreement, and the illusion of 
unanimity on the part of the external liaison, a result of the self-censorship carried out by 
the work group members.  
 
One of the strongest sources of support for groupthink phenomenon comes from 
Hensley & Griffin (1984). This paper applies the model to the crisis that faced the board 
of trustees of Kent State University during the period of 1976 to 1977, utilizing a case 
study analysis as well as interviews with key figures involved in the crisis. The crisis was 
centered around the construction of an addition to the school’s gymnasium. The location 
chosen for the new addition was also the site of the infamous Kent State Massacre in 
1970, an event which involved the national guard killing four students and wounding 
numerous others. The selection of this site was met by immense backlash from students, 
faculty and even third parties such as state and national politicians. Despite the immense 
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pressure to capitulate and choose a different site, the majority of the trustees stuck to their 
original decision throughout. Hensley & Griffin found evidence for nearly every facet of 
the groupthink model, from antecedent conditions to defects in decision making in their 
analysis of this case. Evidence for Janis’ cardinal antecedent of group cohesion comes 
from their social relationships within the group and the prestige resulting from 
membership. An analysis of voting records from prior meetings also showed a tendency 
towards unanimous decisions. Structural faults were evidenced by the lack of student or 
faculty representation in the board (evidence of insulation), evidence of unanimous and 
undisputed decision making (lack of impartial leadership), a lack of structure in the 
process of decision making and a shared social background (homogeneity of members). 
Situational context factors included immense external pressure from students, faculty and 
outsiders, and low self esteem (resulting from the board of trustees having to deal with 
the power vacuum left by the departure of the previous president). The refusal by the 
board to allow the use of external mediators hinted at concurrence seeking tendencies and 
thereby opening up the case for interpretation as per the symptoms of groupthink. Illusion 
of invulnerability can be seen in the trustees dismissal of the threat posed by student 
protestors as well as a notion that they could tackle any problem they were faced with. 
Feelings of inherent group morality are visible in the way that the trustees viewed the 
conflict as a battle between right and wrong. Hensley & Griffin suggest that the trustees 
underwent four main collective rationalizations, 1) the participation of students in the 
selection process, 2) oppositions to the site was not on the same level as the trustees 
decision, 3) no other options existed and 4) the site was just a symbol for a deeper 
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conflict. Support for the symptom of stereotypes of the opposition is flimsy at best as 
there is no evidence that they viewed the student and faculty coalition as incompetent, 
although there is evidence to suggest that they saw them as morally base. Self-censorship 
was seen by the fact that several members were conflicted in their support of the site but 
still voted with the majority. Three of the nine members of the board were openly in 
disagreement with the decisions of the board, so there is no solid evidence suggesting an 
illusion of unanimity. Dissenters saw harsh repercussions, and discussion often became 
heated and emotional when dissent was introduced. Several members of the board did 
engage in mind guarding as well by blocking potentially relevant information form 
discussions. Evidence also exists for all eight defects of decision, except the failure to 
plan for contingencies which the board had carried out multiple times. While it must be 
noted that this case did not perfectly support the groupthink model, it did meet all the 
requirements posited by Janis (1982), thereby strongly hinting at the existence of 
groupthink. The outcome may not have been a “fiasco” on the same scale as those 
described by Janis, but the costs were still high and clearly avoidable. Furthermore, 
Hensley & Griffin do advocate for the addition of some additional factors such as a 
failure to communicate with the opposition, refusal to work with mediators and refusal to 
postpone or prolong the decision making process.  
 
McCauley (1989) revisits the cases analyzed by Janis (1972, 1982) paying special 
attention to the role played by compliance. Compliance (public agreement coupled with 
private disagreement), as per McCauley, plays a separate role when compared to 
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cohesion. McCauley disagrees with Janis’ assertion that compliance will decrease with 
group cohesion (compliance will give way to internalization instead). Cohesion in the 
context of groupthink refers to attraction to the group and the desire to continue being a 
member. McCauley notes that cohesion and compliance need not go hand in hand. 
Particularly, one might feel so certain of group support that they see no need to comply. 
He then goes on to state that the structural and situational antecedent conditions, in 
addition to increasing cohesion, may also increase compliance. To support this he cites 
the examples of lack of impartial leadership which he says is, in essence, the setting of 
norms, lack of decision making framework is akin to a lack of norms that might counter 
those set by the leader and member homogeneity will limit differences in opinion. To 
support his idea of compliance’s role, McCauley revisits case studies in Janis (1982). In 
the Bay of Pigs case, he states that evidence for compliance lies in the different 
explanations of what occured. Janis’ explanation states that the policy group had reached 
a high level of cohesion but wasn’t at a stage where the individual members could be 
completely frank. Another explanation hypothesizes that, like many politicians, the 
members of the group were afraid of losing status if they objected. A common thread in 
the explanations is the presence of self-censorship. Janis states that the members of the 
policy group, who were all highly educated and revered politicians would be unlikely to 
simply comply. McCauley, however, points out that such interpretations are highly 
subjective, and that evidence does not point towards internalization. McCauley makes an 
important distinction here, doubts in terms of the decision outcome are not evidence of 
compliance, however, doubts relating to whether or not the decision is right are. 
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McCauley goes on to analyze the rest of the case studies most of which he interprets as 
being groupthink without the influence of compliance save for the escalation of the 
Vietnam War which, like the Bay of Pigs, contains evidence pointing towards 
compliance. Since only two out of the six case studies support the compliance theory, it is 
difficult to say that the antecedents of groupthink serve as antecedents of compliance. 
Therefore, it is also not prudent to say that the two are inextricably linked. Nonetheless, 
McCauley draws attention to a flaw in the groupthink model. It is interesting to note that 
in many empirical studies, the measure of self-censorship is typically linked with 
compliance in that members may publicly agree, but share other sentiments privately.  
 
Moorhead et al (1991) applies the groupthink model to a more recent event, the 
Challenger Disaster of 1986. The analysis of the flight readiness meeting prior to the 
launch of the shuttle reveals a clear presence of groupthink. Antecedent conditions, such 
as a failure to meet directly with the engineers to discuss concerns that were brought up 
(insulation), were present. This led to symptoms of groupthink such as stereotyped views 
of the engineers (the opposition) and defects in decision making, such as the assertion 
that the shuttle would either launch on the given day or not launch at all (few 
alternatives). Overall, the case exhibits all the necessary factors in the groupthink model. 
Key takeaways from this study include the researchers assertions that two more factors 
must be added to the groupthink model. These factors are time and leadership (advocated 
a more significant emphasis on its role), both of which are important in this case. Time 
constraints were relevant because the launch was already facing delays, and the 
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committee was trying to prevent further such delays in order to save face in front of the 
politicians. Leadership is already included in the model, but Moorhead et al advocated for 
it to play a much bigger role and serve as a necessary precondition like group cohesion. 
 
Moorhead & Neck (1992) provided yet another application of the theory of 
groupthink, this time in the judicial system looking at the trial of famous businessman 
and cocaine trafficker, John Delorean. In this case, all the antecedent conditions were 
present among the jury members yet groupthink was avoided. In effect, the jury group did 
not exhibit the symptoms of groupthink. The researchers chalk this up to the use of 
structured decision making procedures. Three components of methodical decision making 
are put forth. These are procedures for exploring alternatives, searching for information 
and allowing for democratic leadership. This study is useful in that it expands Janis’ 
(1972, 1982) idea of using procedure to prevent groupthink, allowing it to be more easily 
applied.  
 
 
Empirical Studies of Groupthink 
 
Janis (1972) offered no empirical support for his concept of Groupthink. Instead, 
he utilized an analysis of past foreign policy “fiascoes” to offer support for his theory. 
This lack of experimental evidence has led to skepticism as to the validity of Groupthink, 
a skepticism that Janis failed to address. The burden of empirical proof has therefore 
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fallen on the research community. Many have attempted to investigate the phenomenon, 
and notable/significant attempts to do so will be briefly detailed in the following section 
 
Flowers (1977) was the first attempt to empirically support Janis’ theory of 
groupthink, occurring only 5 years after Janis first proposed the concept. Flowers’ study 
utilized a 2 x 2 factorial design with the two independent variables being leadership style 
(closed or open) and group cohesiveness (high or low), both of which were factors Janis 
considered integral to the occurrence of Groupthink. Outcome variables included the 
number of solutions suggested and the use of facts provided. The sample was composed 
of 120 college students from Indiana and Syracuse Universities. These students were split 
into 40 groups consisting of 3 members and a leader (who received special training). The 
training consisted of the leaders being given a set of instructions corresponding to either 
the “open” or “closed” leadership styles. “Open” leaders were told to not make their 
personal opinion known until the rest of the members had done so, encourage adequate 
discussion of each possible solution and emphasize the importance of taking all 
viewpoints into consideration. “Closed” leaders, on the other hand, were told to state their 
preference before beginning the discussion, not encourage dialogue of each and every 
possible solution and emphasize the importance of consensus on the group’s decision. 
Group cohesion was manipulated by either ensuring the group members were strangers or 
asking the leader to recruit his/her acquaintances as members of his group. The groups 
met and their discussions were recorded for later analysis. The members of each group 
were assigned a role in order to rapidly acclimate them with the case study they were 
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presented. The case study given to the groups was a made up personnel issue facing a 
school board. It was designed in order to present elements that were common to the case 
studies presented by Janis. These were controversy (there is no clear “best” answer), 
aspect of morality (concerned the fate of other individuals), time dependent crisis (a 
decision was required immediately), competition with hostile/outside group and a lack of 
complete shared knowledge (some facts were withheld and only given to members 
playing a specific role). The groups were told to reach a decision within 30 mins and 
upon completion (finding a solution that everyone agreed upon) were given an individual 
questionnaire assessing pre and post -discussion consensus, perception of freedom to 
speak out, willingness to do a similar activity with the same group in the future and 
attractiveness of the group (in terms of being interesting, engaging and enjoyable). The 
tapes were analyzed by judges who were kept unaware of the experiment’s purposes in 
order to ensure that the rules of the experiment were followed by all participants. Further 
analysis of the answers to the questionnaire revealed some telling results. Regardless of 
the cohesiveness of the groups, there was a main effect of leadership style on the outcome 
variables of # of solutions proposed and use of facts. In other words, groups which had 
closed leaders saw fewer solutions proposed and fewer facts utilized, both signs that 
could indicate groupthink. On the other hand there was an almost negligible effect of 
cohesiveness on both outcome variables. This directly contradicts Janis’ assumption of 
the essential nature of cohesiveness in the groupthink model. Flowers offers several 
potential explanations for this issue. It is possible that the way the leadership styles were 
designed could have caused them to potentially reduce the observed effect attributed to 
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cohesiveness of the groups. Flowers also notes several key differences between the 
cohesiveness in the experiment and the cohesiveness in Janis’ “fiascoes”. The 
perpetrators in Janis’ case studies had relationships which had existed for a much longer 
period of time with the fellow group members as well as existing on both professional 
and social levels. Flowers also acknowledges the differences in the situations attributed to 
importance, magnitude, group size, etc, as well as suggesting that Janis had omitted a 
potentially relevant variable, the degree of power the leader has over the rest of the 
members. Flowers suggested that adding power as a factor in the groupthink model might 
strengthen the case for groupthink. 
 
Courtright (1978) was another early attempt to investigate the groupthink 
phenomenon in a laboratory setting. The study utilized a 2 x 3 design. The independent 
variables were group cohesion and what Courtright described as strict parameters set by 
the group leader in relation to acceptable solutions, referred to as the induction of 
parameters. It should be noted here that a major shortcoming of this study was the 
omission of the third factor Janis noted as important for predicting groupthink, the 
blocking of potentially relevant outside information. Instead of manipulating this variable 
as well, as was attempted in Flowers (1977), Courtright chose to make all relevant 
information available to all groups regardless of experimental condition. Outcome 
variables consisted of the number of possible solutions proposed by every member, the 
number of statements of agreement per member and the number of statements of 
disagreement per member. Group cohesion was manipulated via the use of a 
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pre-experimental discussion on an unrelated topic. Following this discussion participants 
in low cohesion groups were assigned to new groups to carry out the actual experiment 
whereas high cohesion groups remained together. Induction of parameters was 
manipulated via instructions provided to groups. The groups were split into three separate 
conditions on this basis. The instructions issued were related to the amount of time the 
group had to solve the issue presented to them, Courtright considered using a group 
leader to accomplish this manipulation but felt that doing so resulted in other issues, 
specifically the members’ perception of the leader (who would have to be selected by the 
experimenter as there was insufficient time for a “natural” leader to arise). In the first 
condition (the “freed” condition) participants were told that the time given was more than 
adequate and emphasis was placed on coming up with a large number of solutions. In the 
second condition (the “limited” condition) participants were  told that the time allotted 
was inadequate and emphasis was placed on consensus rather than discussion. The third 
and final condition was given no specific instructions aside from being informed of the 
time available for discussion; they served as the control condition. The sample consisted 
of 96 freshmen enrolled in speech and composition classes at the University of Iowa. The 
participants were split up into groups of 4 and, following the pre-experimental process, 
were either reassigned to new groups or remained in the same group depending on 
whether they were assigned to a low or high cohesion condition. The groups were then 
given a questionnaire in order to check their levels of cohesion. In order to strengthen the 
cohesion variable, members of high cohesion groups were told that their results showed 
that they were highly compatible. Members of low cohesion groups were told that it was 
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not possible to find the most compatible group for them and they were therefore 
randomly assigned. The groups were then given the case study which they attempted to 
solve (“What is the best method of recruiting new students to the University of Iowa?”) 
as well as their specific instructions (based on induction of parameters condition). The 
groups were given 25 minutes to come up with a solution. Video recordings of each 
groups’ discussion underwent content analysis by unbiased independent graders. The 
solutions proposed by each group were also graded according to the Leathers 
Productivity Rating Instrument. The results showed that the manipulation of group 
cohesion had produced a significant difference in the perception of cohesion among 
participants. In addition, groups in the high cohesiveness limited condition showed far 
fewer statements of disagreement (which can be seen as indicative of groupthink). 
Results relating to the quality of solutions proposed were not significant, however, the 
importance of this parameter may be overestimated as Janis (1972) noted that groupthink 
need not always result in bad decisions being made. Courtright sees the results as 
supportive of his two goals, namely to test the accuracy of Janis’ theory and gauge its 
ability to be tested empirically. However, the only significant outcome variable was the 
statements of disagreement, which Courtright contends to be indicative of groupthink. 
Therefore, evidence in this particular study can be seen as somewhat lacking. It should 
also be noted that the results directly contradict those of Flowers (1977), who could not 
show a significant effect of cohesiveness on groupthink symptoms. In addition some 
experimental issues such as the omission of several potentially important variables and 
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low interrater reliability necessitate that we view the results of this study with a grain of 
salt. 
 
Callaway & Esser (1984) built upon the findings of Flowers (1977) and 
Courtright (1978). Their study utilized a 2 x 2 factorial design with cohesiveness and 
procedure as the independent variables. The outcome variables were responses to a 
questionnaire designed to measure cohesiveness on the basis of several factors (such as 
willingness to participate in a similar activity with the same group in the future, ability of 
the group, effectiveness of the experimenter in creating groups) and performance on two 
tasks (the “horse trader task” and “lost at sea task”) aimed at measuring decision quality. 
Similar to previous studies, analysis was carried out via tape recordings of the 
discussions. Cohesiveness was manipulated using a method akin to the one utilized by 
Courtright (1978). Participants were given a questionnaire prior to the experiment that 
supposedly assessed their personality. On the basis of this dummy questionnaire, they 
were told they were either matched (high cohesiveness) or that the experimenter had been 
unable to match them (low cohesiveness)  with their fellow group members. Procedure 
was manipulated via written instructions provided to the groups. Groups in the procedure 
present conditions were issued these instructions which highlighted several important 
factors for good decision making (such as exploration of all possible solutions, 
willingness to question possible decisions). Those in the procedure absent condition were 
issued no instructions. The cohesiveness manipulation showed significant results, with 
groups in the high cohesion condition rating themselves higher on the post experimental 
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questionnaire. There were, however, no significant results in terms of decision quality. In 
order to get a more accurate picture, the experimenters carried out a second round of 
analyses by dividing the groups into three categories (low, medium and high) based on 
summed cohesiveness scores.  This second round of analysis showed a significant main 
effect of group cohesion on the lost at sea task, with high cohesion groups scoring higher 
(indicative of a poor decision in this case) than the other two conditions. Notably, 
medium cohesion groups scored lowest in this task, suggesting that a moderate amount of 
cohesion might lead to better decision making.  Further scrutiny of the questionnaire and 
recordings revealed fewer statements of disagreement in the high cohesion groups as well 
as higher ratings of confidence. The higher ratings of confidence, in particular, could 
denote evidence for Janis’ first symptom of groupthink, a false sense of invincibility 
among group members that results in high levels of risk taking and over-optimism. The 
horse trader task showed no significant results, although the experimenters note that this 
task may not be indicative of the type of situation that could lead to groupthink as there is 
only one correct solution to the task (Janis stated that situations that could result in 
groupthink would have many possible solutions). There also seems to be a mixed effect 
in relation to the procedure manipulation, contradictory to the results of Flowers (1977) 
who carried out a similar manipulation via leadership style. A possible explanation for 
this could be the weaker manipulation carried out in this study, Flowers and Courtright 
both utilized conditions in which factors influencing good decision making were 
encouraged and discouraged, whereas Callaway and Esser only included a condition in 
which such practices were encouraged.  
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Leana (1985) replicated the study carried out by Flowers (1977) in light of 
revisions made to the groupthink theory by Janis (1982). The study used a 2 x 2 factorial 
design with leadership style (directive or participative) and cohesiveness (high or low) as 
independent variables. The sample was composed of 208 undergraduate students. A key 
difference in this study from Flowers is that groups in the cohesive condition were made 
from students who had worked in the same groups for class projects over the course of a 
semester. Participants in the non-cohesive condition were randomly assigned to groups. 
Non-cohesive groups had a randomly selected leader, whereas cohesive groups were 
issued a questionnaire a couple of weeks prior to the study to assess which member of 
group was perceived to have the most influence. This individual was then chosen as 
group leader. Leaders assigned to the participative condition were told to follow 
procedures that counteract groupthink (stating their preference last, encouraging 
exploration of all alternatives). Directive leaders were told to enact behaviors that would 
increase likelihood of groupthink (state their preference first, emphasize coming to a 
decision quickly). Just as in Flowers, each member of the group was assigned a particular 
role and given specific information relating to that role which was not made available to 
the rest of the group. The groups were all given the same situation in which they had to 
choose an employee (out of 6) to lay off. Manipulation checks were carried out on the 
independent variables (cohesion and leadership style). Cohesive groups had higher scores 
of group attraction and participative leaders had members with a higher perceived 
freedom of expression, thereby confirming that both manipulations had been successful. 
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An additional manipulation check was carried out on the leadership variable by gauging 
the leader’s influence in reaching their respective group’s final decision. This check 
showed that directive leaders had more influence on group decisions and that differences 
between cohesive (“elected”) and non-cohesive (“appointed”) group leaders were not 
significant. The outcome variable of decision processes was split into several separate 
parts. On the first part, self-censorship. There was no significant effect on self censorship 
between directive and participative leaders however, there was a noticeable and 
statistically significant effect in terms of group cohesion. Interestingly, the results here 
contradict Janis’ (1982, 1972) theory; groups with high cohesion showed less self 
censorship than those with low cohesion. The next portion of the theory to be analyzed 
was selective bias in processing of information available. Analysis here was carried out 
by listening to tape recordings of the discussions and identifying instances of information 
being given to groups after a decision was made. This could be interpreted as an attempt 
to bolster support for the decision that the group had agreed upon. However, no 
significant effects could be seen here. The next metric was the number of solutions 
proposed and discussed by each group. Mirroring the results of Flowers’ study, no 
difference was seen between cohesive and non cohesive groups. Participative leaders, 
however, on average had more proposed solutions than directive ones. Risks and 
reappraisal were the final two factors to be analyzed, but showed no significant effects. 
Leana notes that this and the results seen for selective biases might be a result of the time 
constraint. Analysis of the decisions themselves and the questionnaire revealed that, 
despite going along with the decision, members of groups in the directive leader 
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condition often did not agree with the final decision made by the group. In summary, the 
study reiterated the findings of Flowers (1977) in relation to the influence of leadership 
style on groupthink. The contradiction of results in relation to group cohesion, however, 
seems startling. Leana states that this could possibly be due to the fact that the members 
of the high cohesion groups may be more comfortable with each other and therefore be 
more willing to speak their mind. An important attribute she notes here is the 
interweaving of task oriented groups and experience of working with fellow members, 
both of which could be attributes that contribute to the results seen. She suggests that 
future studies separate these two to more clearly determine which one is responsible.  
 
Gladstein and Reilly (1985) analyzed a different component of Janis’ (1972, 
1982) Groupthink model, the role played by external threat. The researchers hypothesized 
that the existence of an external threat could limit information processing as well as 
create a bias towards a presiding decision. In order to test this theory, they utilized a 
management simulation known as Tycoon. The Tycoon simulation, which took place 
over the course of 6 days, consisted of participants choosing a company (each with its 
own unique characteristics) via a bidding war and then proceeding to run and manage all 
aspects of said company. A key part of this simulation was the the ability of the 
researchers to institute external events such as natural disasters, major government policy 
changes and even terrorism. These events played the role of external threats to the 
decision making group. Time pressure was also manipulated by cutting the allotted 
decision making time from 3 hours to 45 minutes halfway through the simulation. The 
32 
WHY EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE GROUPTHINK MODEL HAVE FAILED  
sample was composed of MBA students at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
University enrolled in a business policy class. One hundred and twenty eight students 
were used in the study and were formed into 24 groups (each representing a company) 
consisting of 5 to 6 people. A 2 x 2 factorial design was utilized with the two dependent 
variables being impact of the external event (high or low) and time pressure (high and 
low). The events were classified as high or low impact based on the financial 
consequences resulting from the event. The order of high impact and low impact events 
was randomized for each group so that all groups went through all four experimental 
conditions. Dependent variables were measured using a questionnaire filled out at the end 
of a decision making period which assessed information processing as well as loss of 
control. Results of the study showed that increased external threat resulted in restricted 
information processing and higher levels of stress. Increased time pressure, however, did 
not seem to produce conclusive results across the measures of information processing. 
The researchers hypothesized that even though one might assume that a decrease in time 
would result in less information processing, it might instead lead to more efficient 
information processing. There was no evidence to support that loss of control correlated 
with threat or time pressure. While not explicitly testing groupthink, this study is still 
useful in that it tests a facet of the model that hasn’t seen much research. It must also be 
noted that even though the researchers did not control cohesion, participants were 
permitted to self select into their groups meaning that cohesion could very well have 
played a role in some of the results seen.  
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Callaway, Marriott and Esser (1985) also took a different approach when testing 
the groupthink hypothesis, looking particularly at the role played by dominance exhibited 
by group members.In addition, the researchers also wanted to test Janis’ (1972) 
suggestion that concurrence seeking occurred in order to reduce levels of stress. 
Dominance in this case was defined as a tendency to “argue, persuade and influence 
others” as well as a tendency to play the role of leader. The sample was comprised of 112 
students recruited from lower-level psychology classes, formed into 28 groups of 4. The 
study used a 2 x 2 factorial design, with dominance and presence of decision making 
procedures. The dependent variables were decision quality , measured via the Lost at Sea 
task used in Callaway and Esser (1984), and process measures, obtained via analysis of 
the recordings of group discussions alongside a set of post experimental questionnaires. 
Prior to being formed into groups, these students were given a questionnaire meant to 
assess the level of dominance trait in their personality. They were classified as either low 
or high dominance via the use of a median split. Group cohesion was held constant by 
telling participants that the questionnaire had been used to match them with their fellow 
group members, thereby attempting to simulate high group cohesion. The presence of 
procedure was manipulated by telling groups in the procedure present condition 
guidelines for good decision making. Results showed that high dominance groups had 
higher quality decisions, used more discussion time, had more statements of 
disagreement and agreement,  and had lower levels of state anxiety. Procedures present 
groups used less discussion time.  The study thereby provided support for the stress 
reduction hypothesis of groupthink. Results for the utilization of procedures (which 
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should combat groupthink) were inconclusive however. The researchers note that, 
especially in the case of low dominance groups, personal accountability may be 
necessary in order to effectively carry out a good decision making procedure. 
 
Moorhead and Montanari (1986) presents a comprehensive test of the groupthink 
phenomenon in light of the slightly revised and more clearly stated model of groupthink 
in Janis (1982). The particularly focuses on the causal sequence put forth by Janis, with 
antecedents leading to symptoms and so on. Moorhead and Montanari initially comment 
on several previous Groupthink studies, namely Flowers (1977), Courtright (1978) and 
Leana (1985). They  state that the issues with these studies, in particular Flowers (1977) 
and Courtright (1978), are that they failed to create the necessary antecedents for 
groupthink to occur. In particular, they failed to accurately recreate the cohesiveness 
described by Janis (1972, 1982). Furthermore they note that Courtright’s study, while 
attempting to be comprehensive, still only managed to account for only two of the 
antecedent conditions and only three of the defects in decision making. To this accord, 
Moorhead and Montanari sought to create an inclusive test of groupthink phenomenon. 
They began by searching for scales relevant to the variables present in the groupthink 
model, but were only able to find measures pertaining to cohesion. Therefore, scales for 
the other seven antecedent conditions were created by the researchers. The scales were 
designed as 5 point likert-type measures and were tested to ensure validity. These scales 
were eventually expanded into the Groupthink Assessment Inventory detailed in depth in 
Moorhead & Montanari (1989). Testing and analyses revealed that the underlying 
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concepts of some of the antecedent conditions were closely related to what Janis had 
proposed but, for the sake of simplicity, the three factor that explained the most variance 
(cohesion, insulation and leadership) were used. Analyses of the symptoms however 
revealed that there was significant similarity in some of the underlying concepts. 
Therefore, the symptoms were distilled into four factors utilized in the study. These were: 
Invulnerability (illusion of invulnerability and negative perception of non-group 
individuals), Group Morality (inherent feelings of group morality and 
unanimity/rationalization), Self-Censorship and Discouraged Dissent (pressure on 
dissenters and negative view of dissenters).  Defects in decision making underwent a 
similar process resulting in two distinct factors, Few Alternatives (# of alternatives 
discussed and lack of consideration regarding contingencies) and Lack of Expert Advice 
(rejection of outside expertise and selective bias in use of information). Antecedent 
conditions not manipulated were controlled via experimental conditions (ex. Use of 
extreme time constraint on decision making). As with numerous other studies in this 
realm, the sample consisted of students recruited from business policy classes. These 
students were arranged into team of 3-5 for an overall team count of 45. It is useful to 
note here that all the teams had previously worked together in a competitive simulation 
over the course of 3 months and were therefore familiar with one another. Because the 
data procured from this study was cross-sectional, the researchers decided to carry out a 
path analysis instead of an ANOVA/MANOVA typically seen in the aforementioned 
studies. The use of path analysis also allowed the researchers to get a better idea of the 
causal relationships between the antecedent conditions, symptoms and decision making 
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defects. The results showed that the most significant antecedent condition was insulation. 
The groups that rated themselves highest on this category had the lowest performance. 
The other antecedent conditions failed to show any noticeable effects on performance. 
All the antecedent conditions did, however, have an impact on symptoms and defects. 
Cohesion had a negative correlation with self-censorship and the defect of alternatives as 
well as positive correlation with discouragement of dissent. Insulation was negatively 
correlated with invulnerability and rejection of expert advice and positively correlated 
with the proposal of alternatives. Leadership was positively correlated with morality and 
discouraging dissent and negatively correlated with  the defect of alternatives. These 
results showed mixed support for the groupthink model. Some of the results, such as the 
positive correlation between leadership and morality/discouraging dissent, reinforce the 
theory. On the other hand, the results also directly contradict the relationships that Janis 
proposed, such as the negative correlation between cohesion and self-censorship. Despite 
this, the study holds merit as one of the most comprehensive tests of groupthink, focusing 
on all four levels of the theory. Furthermore, even if they do not match Janis’ theory, the 
causal relationships seen between each of the four levels provided some support for the 
framework of groupthink. The study was also groundbreaking in that the nature of 
cohesion among the groups (based on longer term relationships among group members as 
seen in Janis’ case studies) is far more similar to the cohesion described by Janis.  
 
Turner et Al (1992) attempted to build on previous empirical studies of 
groupthink, most notably Callaway & Esser (1984) and Flowers (1977), in order to get a 
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better understanding of the underlying mechanisms of groupthink. In particular, the 
researchers tried to reconcile the conflicting results seen in previous groupthink research. 
The researchers hypothesized that poor decision making attributable to groupthink should 
only occur in groups with high external threat and high cohesion (i.e. those with all the 
antecedent conditions of groupthink present, the “strict” hypothesis). They also note two 
possible hypotheses in relation to decision quality, the “additive” hypothesis (addition of 
more antecedent conditions lead to poorer decisions being made and the “liberal” 
hypothesis (takes into account unique factors present in each situational context). The 
researchers note that these hypotheses are applicable in the case of symptoms and 
decision making defects as well. To test this, Turner and her colleagues carried out three 
separate experiments. The first experiment was a basic test of the groupthink theory using 
a 2 x 2 design with group cohesion and external threat as the independent variables. The 
sample was comprised of 180 students, arranged into groups of 3. Threat was 
manipulated by telling groups in the high threat condition that they were being 
videotaped and that poorly performing groups would be used as part of a training 
program. High cohesion groups were given name tags identifying them with a certain 
group and engaged in a short pre-experimental discussion of their similarities. Decision 
quality and self reports of symptoms and decision making defects served as dependent 
variables. Results showed that groups in  the high cohesion/high threat category and low 
cohesion/low threat category produced the poorest quality decisions. Cohesion and threat 
had mixed effects on groupthink symptoms. Most interestingly high cohesion resulted in 
decreased self censorship, a direct contradiction of Janis’ theory.  Results as per decision 
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making defects were also inconclusive. This points to the existence of the “liberal” 
hypothesis of groupthink as opposed to the “strict” or “additive” one. The researchers 
interpreted the results as supportive of what they term “social identity maintenance”, an 
underlying mechanism of groupthink in which members strive to preserve their 
affirmative view of group functioning. The second experiment was an expansion of the 
manipulation check to ensure that cohesion had properly been induced. The sample used 
consisted of 72 students assigned into groups of 3. Cohesion served as the independent 
variable and was manipulated using methods similar to those in the first experiment. 
Self-report scales of cohesion acted as the dependent variables. Results showed that the 
cohesion manipulation had produced higher scores on the cohesion scales. With these 
results as well as social identity maintenance in mind, the third and final experiment 
aimed to replicate as well as extend the pilot study. In order to further test social identity 
maintenance, the experimenters included manipulation of “distraction” as well. This 
distraction consisted of music being played in the background during group discussions, 
which in theory would provide an excuse for potentially faulty decision making and 
thereby prevent group members from having to unconsciously carry out detrimental 
behaviors to preserve their positive image of the group’s decision making process. 
Cohesion was held constant in this study by giving all groups the high cohesion 
manipulation from experiment 1. Therefore, threat and distraction served as the 
independent variables. The same dependent variables used in the first experiment 
(decision quality, symptoms of groupthink and defects in decision making) were carried 
over. Results were consistent with experiment 1 in that groups with high external threat 
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performed the worst, notably though groups with high threats and a present distraction 
performed noticeably better. As cohesion was not manipulated here, results for symptoms 
of groupthink and defects in decision making were ambiguous. Overall, this experiment 
succeeded in replicating the results of the initial experiment in that high threat/high 
cohesion led to the lowest decision quality, as well as supporting the social identity 
maintenance mechanism. As a whole, the study enables a deeper look at the underlying 
functions of groupthink. The lack of support for the additive and strict hypotheses might 
also lead to a questioning of the causal sequence inherent in groupthink framework as per 
Janis (1982) as well as Moorhead & Montanari (1986, 1989).  
 
Bernthal & Insko (1993) looked at one of the most conflicted aspects of 
groupthink research, group cohesion. The researchers sought to investigate the mixed 
support seen for Janis’ (1972,1982) assertion that group cohesion was the single most 
important antecedent condition for groupthink. In order to do this, the researchers made a 
key distinction between “task-oriented cohesion” and “social-emotional cohesion”. 
Task-oriented cohesion represents a drive to accomplish the objectives and tasks given to 
the group. Social-emotional cohesion denotes maintenance of social relationships among 
group members as most important to the group. The researchers note that the 
manipulation of cohesion in prior studies, such as Callaway & Esser (1984), is mainly a 
manipulation of  task-oriented cohesion as participants are typically told that they were 
matched with the fellow group members in order to maximize performance of the task 
given, thereby at least partially explaining mixed support for the groupthink model. 
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Based on this, the two hypotheses were that groupthink symptoms would be least 
probable in highly task-cohesive groups and most probable in highly social-emotional 
cohesive groups. The sample consisted of 138 female undergraduate students from the 
University of Carolina Chapel Hill. The decision to use only female students may seem 
rather odd and could lead to a bias in the results as seen in previous studies such as Kroon 
et Al (1992), which noted that the composition of groups based on gender could have an 
effect on groupthink symptoms. In other words, homogeneity in terms of sex of the group 
members could affect cohesion, however, as cohesion was controlled in this study this 
may not have a noticeable effect on the results. The participants were split into 46 groups 
of three. Participants started by answering two falsified tests supposedly measuring social 
and problem-solving skills. Upon completion they underwent a training condition in 
which they were trained to use one of three decision making cues. These cues were used 
so that in the following stage (completion of a decision-making task), the experimenter 
could induce conflict by having at least 1 group member utilize a different cue than the 
rest of the group. The two variables to be manipulated were task-cohesion and 
social-emotional cohesion. This was done by telling groups that they had performed well 
on either of the pre-experimental questionnaires for the high conditions or that they had 
performed poorly for the low conditions. The dependent variable was a self rating of 
factors influencing group cohesion. Results showed an interaction effect between the 
social confidence measure (related to social antecedents of groupthink such as the illusion 
of invulnerability and belief in inherent morality of the group). In particular groups in the 
high task-cohesive/low social-emotional cohesive condition saw the lowest scores of 
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social confidence, suggesting a low susceptibility to groupthink. There was also a main 
effect of social-emotional cohesion such that groups with high social-emotional cohesion 
had high ratings of social confidence. On the flip side, highly task-cohesive groups 
showed high task focus, which could counteract the effects of groupthink. The 
researchers note here that both high social-emotional cohesive groups and high task 
cohesive groups rated higher confidence in their decisions, but also state that it is likely a 
different form of confidence with the task cohesive groups acknowledging that individual 
members might hold conflicting views and opinions. Bernthal & Insko’s study is crucial 
in that it investigates the core aspect of Janis’ groupthink model and offers a partial 
explanation why empirical research of groupthink has produced such mixed results. Apart 
from differentiating between forms of cohesion, the researchers also acknowledge that 
the cohesion seen in Janis’ case studies as well as most qualitative studies of groupthink 
might be fundamentally different from what has been replicated by empirical research on 
the field.  
 
Park (2000) marks yet another attempt to comprehensively test the groupthink 
model. Park starts by establishing the discrepancy in groupthink research and 
summarizing all the available research at the time. This was put into a table which is 
included in the appendix (Figure 3.). The sample used in the study was comprised of 256 
students at the University of Pittsburgh. The participants underwent random assignment 
and were put into 64 groups of four. The groups were given both verbal and written 
instructions (pertaining to their role and condition) and were then given 50 minutes to 
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carry out a decision making task. The task was based on a real life story published in the 
Wall Street Journal concerning executives at a nuclear energy company. In order to test 
the sharing of information, specific pieces of information were only given to group 
members in certain roles. A monetary incentive for performance was advertised to the 
groups in order to encourage participation, however Park acknowledges that this could’ve 
also affected the groupthink process by encouraging better decision making 
procedures.Participants were encouraged act as themselves rather than play a role. All the 
factors present in the groupthink model were measured using a number of methods 
ranging from self-report measures to content analyses of video recordings. Park paid 
particular attention to the causal relationships between factors. Results supported the 
causal sequence of the model. Antecedents showed strongest effects on the symptoms, 
the symptoms showed strongest effects on defects of decision making and defects of 
decision making showed strong effects on decision quality. However, it must also be 
noted that the relationship between the antecedents and the defects of decision making 
were also significant, which is not supportive of the model’s causal sequence. A deeper 
look into the relationships reveals that only seven individual factors have significant 
relationships (group cohesiveness, style of leadership, lack of procedure, low self esteem, 
illusion of invulnerability, illusion of inherent group morality and failure to examine 
risks). The antecedent conditions saw the most support, with all conditions having 
significant relationships. However on two symptoms and one defect were statistically 
significant. Park acknowledges that there were severe limitations in this study. The most 
glaring one is the failure to control group cohesion. All groups used in this study were ad 
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hoc, thereby failing to meet the cardinal antecedent for groupthink. Park says that the 
study is still valid as this is typical of decision making groups in the real world, however 
it is not sufficient when testing the theory of groupthink. Regardless there is still merit to 
this study in it’s review of existing research as well as its implications for future research.  
 
Criticism of the Groupthink Model 
 
As with any theory, the groupthink model has had its fair share of detractors. Longley and 
Pruitt (1980) commented on the dearth of empirical support and recommended a clearer definition 
of the model. McCauley (1989) detracted from the importance janis placed on cohesiveness and 
suggested compliance as a mechanism instead. Some of the most comprehensive yet scathing 
criticisms of groupthink have come from Fuller & Aldag (1993, 1998).  
 
Fuller & Aldag (1993) takes a critical look at the groupthink proposition. Noting the 
evidence provided by empirical, case and conceptual studies, they comment that primary support 
for the model has come from retrospective case studies. They also note the hodge-podge nature of 
empirical groupthink research; the selection of variables that researchers use seems rather 
arbitrary. General support for groupthink is spotty at best and difficult to determine due to the 
lack of research. It is also noted that no study has adequately and fully tested the groupthink 
model. According to their findings, the most consistently supported variable in the model is the 
antecedent condition of leadership style. Fuller and Aldag in particular criticize the use of only 
“fiascoes” in groupthink research. They see this as allowing a dangerous generalization of the 
phenomenon. They also summarize all the suggested additions to the groupthink model that have 
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been seen in research. These are power of the leader (Flowers, 1977), nature of the task (Callaway 
& Esser, 1984) and stage of group development (Leana, 1985). They incorporate these factors as 
well as others taken from related research to create the General Group Problem Solving Model 
(GGPS). It is not the purpose of this paper to investigate said model but a diagram detailing the 
model has been included in the appendix (Figure 2.) for reference purposes. They state that this 
model is far more suited to investigating group decision making than Janis’ (1972,1982) 
Groupthink Model. Fuller & Aldag suggest research into their GGPS model, but also note that it 
may be too complex (an issue also seen with Groupthink). They also note that longitudinal studies 
could be a useful tool in this area.  
 
Fuller & Aldag (1998) put forth a far more scathing review of groupthink. The authors 
literally demonize groupthink, regaling readers with a fable of the mythical monster “gruffthing”. 
Using this fabricated folk tale, they illustrate their frustrations with the preoccupation of the 
research community with the groupthink model. In particular they note that tendency for 
researchers to see any factor of the groupthink model as indicative of groupthink being 
responsible for bad decisions. It should be noted here that Janis (1972, 1982) did note that 
groupthink was only one of many possible mechanisms that could lead to bad decision making. 
Fuller & Aldag once again bring up the dearth of evidence supporting the model and lament its 
presence in the foreground of group decision making literature. They even note that it has seeped 
into daily life, with numerous news articles being written about the application of groupthink to 
various situations. In particular they state no evidence for the “strong” or strict model of 
groupthink and state that this had led to researchers testing “weak” versions and therefore finding 
partial support. Several other criticisms they present range from an over reliance on concurrence 
seeking, which they see as merely being adopted by the groupthink model from previous 
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research, to the assertion that groupthink is antecedent to poor decision making, which they see as 
due to the fact that the model includes “all the bad things” that could lead to faulty decision 
making. They note that groupthink has succeeded in stimulating group decision making research 
but has cost numerous resources which could have been devoted to the study of processes outside 
the groupthink model.  
 
Overall, Fuller & Aldag do bring up some notable and valid criticism, but oftentimes 
seem to get too caught up in their frustration with the groupthink model. In particular they note 
that warnings to improve research in the area have been ignored. This seems to be the case as the 
community seems to have forgotten the most key component of the groupthink model according 
to Janis (1972, 1982), cohesion.  
 
 
Why Empirical Groupthink Research has Failed 
 
As noted by Janis (1982, 1972), cohesion among the group members is the cardinal 
antecedent condition of groupthink. Without it, groupthink cannot occur. The rest of the factors 
are merely additive and probabilistic in that they need not be present but increase the likelihood 
of groupthink when they are. Almost all empirical studies of groupthink acknowledge the role 
played by cohesion, but none have been able to replicate as per the groupthink model.  
 
It is typical in groupthink research for cohesion to be manipulated as a variable. Typically 
this is done by simply telling the participants in high cohesion conditions that they are a good 
“fit”. This can be seen in studies such as Callaway & Esser (1984), Turner et al (1992), Courtright 
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(1978) and Flowers (1977). Others have attempted to control for cohesion in order to test other 
factors of the model. This includes studies such as Callaway, Marriott & Esser (1985). Most 
strangely, some, such as Park (2000), have even just ignored cohesion all together. Overall, not a 
single study has come close to replicating the form of cohesion described by Janis (1972, 1982) in 
his case studies. The cohesion in the groups in Janis’ case study, as well as in other case studies 
like Hensley & Griffin (1984), was based on bonds formed over years of working together. The 
members of these groups knew each other on a far more personal level in addition to having 
worked together for far longer. This cohesion cannot be replicated by merely telling participants 
that they were a good match. The closest an empirical study has gotten to replicating this level of 
cohesion has been in Leana (1985). The use of groups that had been working together for a 
semester was far closer to being cohesive than the ad hoc groups used in other studies. A similar 
technique was used by Moorhead & Montanari (1986) as well. On average both these studies 
have shown somewhat stronger support for the model than others, suggesting that this could 
possibly be the key to providing empirical support for the groupthink model. It should also be 
noted that Bernthal & Insko (1993) distinction between task-oriented and social-emotional 
cohesion could factor into the the role of cohesion.  
 
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Clearly, it is necessary to accurately portray the type of cohesion Janis (1982,1972) used 
in his model in order to attempt to empirically support the groupthink model. One possible 
solution to this would be to use groups which had existed over a longer period of time in the high 
cohesion condition. These participants could be formed using decision making group that have 
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existed for at least a 3 year period. Applying this to the high cohesion condition in a replication of 
Moorhead & Montanari (1986) could be highly beneficial to the future of groupthink research. 
Such a study is briefly detailed below.  
 
As stated before, Moorhead & Montanari (1986) represents one of the most 
comprehensive tests of groupthink thus far. Park (2000) could also be chosen, but falls 
significantly short due to its use of only ad hoc groups. In particular, the comprehensive testing 
procedure used by Moorhead & Montanari is detailed and expanded in their later publication, 
Moorhead & Montanari (1989). This article details the creation of the Groupthink Assessment 
Inventory. The inventory was created by the researchers for the purpose of providing a complete 
measure of the entire groupthink model. Most of the scales were developed from scratch as there 
were no existing scales available for many of the groupthink factors at the time. A validation 
study was carried out in order to ensure the model was robust. Factor analysis of the scales 
measuring each variable showed that numerous variables were correlated and therefore they were 
distilled into a more testable yet comprehensive measure of groupthink. Therefore the Groupthink 
Assessment Inventory is not a perfect match to the original groupthink model, but can still 
provide insight into its functioning. In particular, several symptoms and defects were combined 
within their respective categories to form new factors. A table detailing the factors is included in 
the appendix. The Groupthink Assessment Inventory was developed in a slightly more 
rudimentary form for use in Moorhead & Montanari (1986) and therefore does not need much 
modification in order to be utilized. The most important factor would be the use of long-term 
groups as opposed to the semester long workgroups used in the study. To accurately represent a 
situation similar to what Janis theorized, a simulation like the “Tycoon” game used by Gladstein 
& Reilly (1985) could be used. Expected results from a path analysis would be a confirmation of 
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the causal sequence seen in the groupthink model, notably a significant effect of the antecedent 
conditions on the symptoms of groupthink and a significant effect of the symptoms on the defects 
in decision making. Furthermore, the directional relationships between the factors would be 
closer to those put forth in the model. Antecedent conditions should be positively linked to 
symptoms which should be positively linked to the defects in decision making.  
 
As noted by Fuller & Aldag (1993), a longitudinal study could also be utilized for the 
study of groupthink. A possibility for this could be applying the same study detailed above, based 
on Moorhead & Montanari (1986), longitudinally to a set of decision making groups. This might 
allow us to witness how the presence of groupthink factors could change as the groups become 
more and more cohesive, it would also allow for control of extraneous variables.  
 
It is clear that the field of groupthink has a long way to go. It is my hope that researchers 
take note of the issues described above in order to more conclusively test Janis’ (1972, 1982) 
groupthink model. Until then criticism of the groupthink model, especially that concerning the 
lack of empirical evidence, must be taken with a grain of salt. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. The Revised Groupthink Model. Adapted from​ Groupthink​ (p. 244), by I. L. 
Janis, 1982, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Copyright 1982 by Houghton Mifflin Company 
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Figure 2. The GGPS Model. Adapted from “Beyond Fiasco: A reappraisal of the 
groupthink phenomenon and a new model of group decision processes”, by R. J. Aldag 
and S. R. Fuller, 1993, ​Psychological Bulletin​, 113(3), p. 544, Copyright 1993 by 
American Psychological Association. 
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Figure 3. Review of Groupthink Research. Reprinted from “​A Comprehensive Empirical 
Investigation of the Relationships among Variables of the Groupthink Model”, by W. 
Park, 2000, ​Journal of Organizational Behavior​, 21(8), p. 874, Copyright 2000 by John 
Wiley and Sons, Ltd. 
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